Mr. Tremblay writes:
In short, we can refute the is-ought false dichotomy in this way: (1) Actions have consequences.
(2) These consequences are within the province of causality, since they are material.
(3) Therefore, the relation between actions and consequences is objective.
To be sure, this doesn’t refute anything, it leaves it hypothetical and begs the question: given that certain actions lead to certain consequences, why ought I to desire a given consequence, and thus choose to perform a given action? For instance, Mr. Tremblay says, “If we eat and drink proper foods and in moderate quantity, we will survive”, but why ought we want to survive? Survival is not an end in itself (people die for higher ends, so survival is a means), thus, as it stands, we are confined to the subjunctive mood, and must begin, “*if* we want to survive, then we ought to ‘eat and drink in moderate quantity.’” As C.S. Lewis said, you cannot go from, “this will preserve society… to [you ought to] do this,”; as I said, you can only say *if*, which is hypothetical.
Objective morality, however, must be premised on a categorical *since*, thus leading to a categorical ought, not a hypothetical *if* producing a hypothetical ought. To be imperative it must be indicative, and since we cannot find anything in “observation attached from desire” to make it so, then we must find it in desire itself – or bust. This means, therefore, that there must be an end in itself that we desire, to which certain actions and consequences are then a necessary means. But where is this end in itself to be found? It is found in the intuition of the good. Since this is an intuition, it is therefore the basis of demonstration; it cannot itself directly be demonstrated. However, like any other intuition (for instance, the law of contradiction) we can indirectly demonstrate its truth; in this case we can do so by noting, as Mortimer Adler put it, our inability to finish the proposition, we want happiness because… The fact is, we simply do, and for no other reason than itself, so that that which really, as opposed to apparently, leads to it is what we’d call the really good. That being the case we can go on to say, *since* I desire happiness for the sake of itself alone therefore I ought to choose only what is really good, that is, really the means to happiness.
Once this categorical ought is established, which requires the inclusion of our subjective point of view (as does knowledge), then we can go on to include objective facts about human nature that can give us a “moral system,” that is, a system of consequences based on given actions. Now, precisely because this ought is categorical - as I cannot think it’s opposite - then I know it applies, universally, to all rational beings; because it applies to all rational beings then I must include all rational human beings as ends in themselves (a Kingdom of ends, as Kant called it), meaning our ends include each other. This interrelation between myself and all other rational beings forms the relation called justice, and answers the Ring of Gyges dilemma posed by Plato so long ago - A magic ring cannot erase your rational and personal relationship to others, the infringement of which frustrates the fulfillment of a potential our nature needs as a means to the attainment of happiness.
How does God relate to all of this? In two ways. First, he meets a transcendent desire (described so well by C.S. Lewis), which is a descriptive property inherent to happiness (the fulfillment of all desire). Second, He serves as the Ground “saving the appearances” by preventing a contradiction for the scientific method. In other words, the self-evident fact of first person experience that, as subjects, we cannot deny we desire an end for the sake of itself and nothing else is contradicted by a third person account of those same subjects which views them apart from an eternal Ground (as the cause of that unchanging end). Moreover, a pure third person account is a pure fiction, for it's always the subject in the first person using the third person; that is, you cannot escape the rational "I", with it's basic intuitions (including goodness), to view it "from nowhere", it is a precondition, it is logically prior, to any and all perspectives.
10 comments:
Interesting.
At times I have contemplated a defense to the sinister Hume's points on the is/ought distinction, but I think the best you can get is prudence. Actions may have consequences, but actions are not really logical--that's the key point.
In some cases a result will follow an action nearly necessarily --" you ought to brush your teeth, given that you don't want cavities." So not brushing teeth, leads to cavities (at least in long run). Philosophers don't care for those "causal conditionals" though (induction, really)
But in ethics/political contexts, we can't see those sorts of strict implications. Someone might say to a young gangster, "You ought not to rob banks if you want to avoid prison", but if the gangster was very bright, and had a good plan, or had succeeded before, he might try it, and even succeed, and prove the warrant wrong.
There's more to it, but Hume's gambit is rather daunting.
Jesse, MacIntyre treats the "ought" as an evaluation of a functional term against its actual performance. "A watch ought to keep good time; this watch loses 20 minutes per day; this is a bad watch." Where a function is involved, there is always an ought, and an evaluative conclusion can be reached.
::Jesse, MacIntyre treats the "ought" as an evaluation of a functional term against its actual performance. "A watch ought to keep good time; this watch loses 20 minutes per day; this is a bad watch." Where a function is involved, there is always an ought, and an evaluative conclusion can be reached.
That's certainly true *if* you have a use for a watch to keep good time. However, if I keep a watch simply for sentimental reasons, say my daughter gave it to me - broken, then someone cannot say to me, "your watch ought to keep good time."
But with morality the important question is, can I say, at some basic level, that this or that person ought to perform or not perform a given action (and, conversely, can they say the same about me) not hypothetically, contingent on an "if," but unconditionally, contingent on a "since." In other words, can I ever speak for others (and they for me) and say that a given action they perform is wrong in an absolute sense?
As C.S. Lewis said, you cannot go from, “this will preserve society… to [you ought to] do this,”
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Apparently Lewis didn't care anything about our society. Interesting.
That's certainly true *if* you have a use for a watch to keep good time. However, if I keep a watch simply for sentimental reasons, say my daughter gave it to me - broken, then someone cannot say to me, "your watch ought to keep good time."
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With twisty logic like this you can always be right. Good for you! :-) I'm sure you're very proud... No really, I'm sure you're very proud.
The parameter "a watch ought to keep good time" is given as a condition, and you ignore it, change it to "a watch can have other value, see!" but you shapeshift neatly around it's primary value of keeping time which defines it as an object.
Plus it would be an even better memento if you could wear it to keep the time.
Yes, with this kind of argumentation it is indeed possible to support Christianity, as with this kind of argumentation you can support Unicorns on Venus if you care to.
::Apparently Lewis didn't care anything about our society. Interesting.
That doesn't follow at all.
::The parameter "a watch ought to keep good time" is given as a condition, and you ignore it, change it to "a watch can have other value, see!" but you shapeshift neatly around it's primary value of keeping time which defines it as an object.
The problem of the "categorical ought" concerns whether or not it can be removed from the sphere of the hypothetical. I say the example of the watch does not do this. Do you say it does?
I say that you are one of the best dissemblers in the world, and have obviously worked hard to become so. I'm honored to post to your blog. It's like being personal friends with Satan. Way cool.
:-)
On a side not, it's not honorable at all. How do you cope with the shame?
If I come across something that will obviously benefit society, and it is within my power to do it, and I choose not to, then I do not care that much about society.
Did I read it wrong? I skimmed. Your writing style is like dissecting a ceolocanth.
:-)
You know, I bet you can give me a cogent and elaborately elegant argument for suicide, too. Or just about anything that you care to. But not one that doesn't radiate falseness, even if one can't quite pin it down in all your tortuous twisty turns of phrase.
You're fun, though, to be sure, so no offense.
That doesn't follow at all
-Jesse
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I forgot to tell you. My dog doesn't follow. But yours doesn't hunt.
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